Aman is home from Qatar. The lender has been paid, and most mornings he sits on the bench in his sister’s tea shop with a glass of chiya and his phone, scrolling through job advertisements from the Gulf. Anshu still charges Rs. 25 a glass. Milk has gone up since last year, and so has sugar, and she hasn’t. The bench is where the bazaar argues. Should Nepal stop calling itself one of the world’s poorest countries? What does it mean that the country is on a list of places whose defenses against dirty money have gaps? And what would it take for a young man like Aman to stop reading those advertisements?
None of these has a settled answer. Each has people who have studied it carefully and come out in different places, and each comes back, in the end, to the glass of tea in Aman’s hand.
Leaving the list
The United Nations has counted Nepal among its least developed countries, अति कम विकसित देश, since the list began in 1971, and Chapter 20 has the three tests a country must pass to leave it: income per person, people’s health and schooling, and how exposed the economy is to shocks. Nepal first passed two of the three in 2015. Its leaving was put off once, after the earthquake, and in November 2021 the General Assembly agreed unanimously that Nepal would leave, giving it five years to prepare instead of the usual three because of Covid. Then Nepal asked for more time again, and in late October 2026 the Assembly moved its date, and Bangladesh’s, to 24 November 2029.
What would leaving change? The UN’s own studies found less than the name suggests. The biggest worry is trade. Many rich countries let the poorest sell to them without tariffs, and a country that leaves the list loses some of that after a few years. A study for the UN’s office for these countries, made with the International Trade Centre, worked out the cost: Nepal would lose about 4.3% of what it sells abroad, some $59 million a year. The average tariff its goods meet would go from about 1% to about 2%.
The reason the loss is small is India. It buys most of what Nepal sells, and it lets Nepal’s goods in under the treaty between the two countries, which, as the UN put it, applies “regardless of Nepal’s LDC status”. Sales to the United States wouldn’t change either. The loss falls mostly on sales to Europe, Turkey, China and Britain, and mostly on clothes, synthetic fabrics and the carpets of Chapter 31. Even there it softens. The European Union keeps its zero tariffs for three years after a country leaves, and if Nepal qualified for the more generous of its later schemes, which asks a country to carry out 27 international agreements on human rights, labor, the environment and good government, Europe’s share of the loss would fall to almost nothing.
Aid changes a little. The UN found that most of what Nepal is given or lent would go on as before, including the loans of the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the IMF. A few lenders are kinder to the poorest countries: Germany gives them grants where others get loans, and Japan and Korea lend to them more cheaply. Nepal might lose its place in a fund that helps the poorest countries adapt to a warming climate, though other climate funds stay open. Whether foreign investors would come more or less, the UN couldn’t say. They might stay away from a country whose goods lost their tariff advantage, or come because a country that left the list looks safer to lend to.
So the argument is mostly about timing. Nepal’s government, asking for more time, pointed to an uncertain world, to trade troubles that could reach the jobs abroad that send money home, to the duty-free access it would lose, and to its own plan for the change, which wasn’t ready. Khalilur Rahman of Bangladesh, who presided over the General Assembly that year, put the case for the delay in one line: “This extension is not a retreat, but an investment in lasting progress.” A writer for the Atlantic Council, a research group in Washington, called the delay “defensible”, but said it would be worth something only if the time were used: Nepal had adopted a strategy for the change two years before and had barely begun to carry it out.
Others thought Nepal should have gone on time. A Nepali researcher writing for a research institute in Singapore said Nepal “might do well in proceeding”. It had passed the tests at four reviews in a row, most of its exports went to India and would be untouched, the European losses were small, and Europe’s tariffs would stay at zero until 2029 in any case. Leaving, the brief said, would “enhance its self-esteem and boost its confidence”.
Both sides read the same numbers. They disagree about what an extra three years buys: time to get ready, or only time.
The gray list
The international body whose words Chapter 15 quoted on hundi is the Financial Action Task Force, FATF. It sets the rules countries follow against money laundering, the hiding of where money came from, and against the money that pays for terrorism, and it checks, through regional bodies like the one that reviewed Nepal in 2023, whether countries really follow them. A country found to have serious gaps, which promises to close them, goes on a list FATF calls jurisdictions under increased monitoring. Its own page notes that everyone else calls it the gray list.
Why should a bazaar care? Because money from crime has to be made to look clean somewhere, and the places that do it are ordinary ones: a plot of land bought with a bag of cash, a cooperative that asks no questions, an agent who moves money without records. The review of 2023 that Chapter 15 described found hundi carrying money out of Nepal as well as in, to get round the limits on sending money abroad and to hide it from tax. Every rupee moved that way is a rupee the banks never see and the tax office never counts.
Nepal has been on it before. It was named in 2010, and in 2014 FATF said it had done enough and was “no longer subject to FATF’s monitoring process”. It went back on in February 2025, after the government made what FATF calls a high-level political commitment to fix the gaps. The plan gives it two years, and the work is checked every four months.
What FATF asks of Nepal is the unfinished business of Chapter 15. Its latest statement sums up what remains in five points. Watch most closely where the risk is greatest: the commercial banks, the riskier cooperatives, casinos, dealers in gold and jewels, and property. Find and punish the large illegal hundi operators. Give the investigators the people and the coordination to look into money laundering. Bring more cases to court. And show that the proceeds of crime can be traced, frozen and taken. By the middle of 2026 the regional body counted real progress on only nine of the plan’s fifteen detailed steps, and it questioned a change to the money-laundering law that the government had made by ordinance. At the end of October Nepal was still on the list.
How much does being on it cost? FATF says the listing itself doesn’t ask anyone to take extra care in dealing with the country, and that money sent home by workers should be “neither disrupted nor discouraged”. Bankers in Nepal say their dealings with banks abroad have become slower and dearer anyway, with more papers to fill in, and officials worried that the World Bank, the IMF and the Asian Development Bank could become stricter. Experts said the listing “will not immediately trigger an economic crisis”, but could slowly raise the costs of banking, trade and investment. A study for the IMF found that being put on the list brings “a large and statistically significant reduction” in the capital flowing into a country from abroad, investment and loans, an average across countries of every kind.
There is a harder question inside the list itself. FATF wants the hundi operators found and punished “without hindering financial inclusion”, that is, without shutting ordinary people out of the banks. FATF doesn’t say what it fears, and we found no study that measures it, but here is one way to read the words. Chapter 15 found hundi most common in villages far from any bank. If the checks at banks and money-transfer firms grew so strict that a worker’s family there found it harder to receive money properly, hundi might become the easier way, the very thing the rules are meant to stop. How tight the checks should be, and how fast, is a question of judgment, not arithmetic.
Work at home
That leaves the question on Aman’s phone. The last census counted 2.19 million Nepalis away from home, someone gone from nearly one household in four, and about 7% of those at home who worked or looked for work were usually without it. Chapter 24 found Nepal’s trouble: farm work has been shrinking faster than work off the farm has been growing. Chapter 32 found what it does to him: the wage at home is still about a third of the wage abroad. Chapter 34 has the plan the government has written. What should be done is where people part.
The World Bank’s answer is selling abroad. “Exports remain the biggest opportunity Nepal has missed to boost growth and create jobs,” it says, and its list of what to do is mostly about removing obstacles: more competition in the businesses that don’t trade across borders, lower and simpler tariffs on what factories import to make things, a review of the cash rewards paid to exporters, or their end, better infrastructure for trade and for checking quality, and a conversation about the peg of Chapter 33. It looks hardest at two other drivers of growth: electricity from Nepal’s rivers, and digital services, which Nepal already sells abroad.
Others, with Ha-Joon Chang and the Korean story of Chapter 20, say a poor country rarely gets rich by removing obstacles alone. It has to choose a few industries, shelter them while they are young, and push them until they can sell abroad. The studies of Korea itself point both ways: one found the most sheltered industries became more productive more slowly, another that a few years of targeted help made the chosen industries lastingly bigger. Governments also try to make work directly, as Chapter 24 described, with roads, training and the hundred days a year the Right to Employment Act promises. These views don’t all exclude each other, and the argument is about weight: how much to leave to firms, how much to choose for them, and how much to do with the government’s own hands.
The Bank had one more idea that starts from Aman’s side of the sum. Money sent home is mostly spent, and little of it is invested (Chapter 32). It suggested savings and investments tied to the money workers send, so that part of the widest arrow in the economy could pay for the work that might one day keep the next Aman at home.
One glass, all the way round
Economists have an old way of drawing a whole economy, the circular flow of income, चक्रीय प्रवाह. Households spend money with firms. Firms pay it back to households as wages, rent, interest and profit. Then the other actors take some money out of the round and put some back in: the government as taxes and spending, the banks as savings and loans, the rest of the world as purchases from abroad, sales abroad and, for Nepal above all, money sent home.
Two things stand out. The arrow from abroad that lands on households, the money workers sent home, is wider than all the government’s taxes, and the arrow of goods bought from abroad is almost as wide. The money sent home pays for the imports, and the little arrow of goods sold abroad barely shows.
Now follow one glass through it. A customer, perhaps a man whose family lives on money from a son in Qatar (Chapter 32), taps his phone, and Rs. 25 moves from his bank account to Anshu’s (Chapter 14). He paid because the glass was worth at least Rs. 25 to him (Chapter 6), and the price is where Anshu’s costs and her customers’ wishes meet (Chapter 10).
Here is where the Rs. 25 goes, on her best day of 280 glasses, by the made-up numbers of her shop (Chapter 12).
| Where one glass’s Rs. 25 goes | Rs. |
|---|---|
| Milk, tea leaf, sugar and gas | 10.00 |
| The room, the stove and glasses wearing out, and interest | 2.14 |
| Sujan and the other helper | 5.00 |
| Anshu’s own time | 2.50 |
| What is left | 5.36 |
The first Rs. 10 leaves the shop at once. Some goes to a dairy and on to farmers with a buffalo or two, some to a tea garden in the east. Some leaves the country. About a third of Nepal’s sugar comes from abroad, and the gas comes through India, so part of that Rs. 10 goes to India, at the rate the peg fixes, and the central bank keeps that rate by buying Indian rupees with dollars (Chapter 33). The imported sugar usually paid customs duty and VAT at the border, where Nepal collects much of its revenue (Chapter 18). That money is part of the wide arrow of goods bought abroad, and it was paid for, in the end, by the wider arrow of money sent home.
The other Rs. 15 is what the shop itself added, and it is Anshu’s share of the country’s GDP (Chapter 13). It is paid out as the four old payments: rent for the room, interest on what she borrowed for the stove (Chapter 12), wages for Sujan, a little above the minimum the law sets (Chapter 24), and profit for taking the risk. Her own Rs. 2.50 is the opportunity cost of her time, the wage she gives up to work for herself (Chapter 3).
Then the money goes round again. Sujan spends his wage at the vegetable seller’s and the barber’s, who spend theirs, the multiplier of Chapter 17. Anshu puts some of her profit in the bank, or in a cooperative, and hopes it is a sound one. The road outside, mended in the rush before mid-July (Chapter 19), was paid for out of taxes like the ones in her sugar.
And the price on the wall stayed at Rs. 25 while prices all round her rose (Chapter 16), so the Rs. 5.36 is getting thinner. If she raises the price, some of her customers will drink fewer glasses, and how many depends on how much they care about the price of tea (Chapter 8). Her Rs. 4,200 a day of value added is a tiny piece of the country’s Rs. 6,600 billion, but every rupee of that total was made the same way, by someone adding a little to what they bought and paying it out to someone else. Nobody arranged any of it. The tea picker in Jhapa has still never heard of her.
What Nepal should do next
Every argument on the bench is about one of those arrows. Leaving the UN’s list changes the terms on the thin arrow of goods sold abroad. The gray list is about the arrow of money from abroad and the banks it passes through. Work at home is about whether the arrow that carries Aman’s earnings could one day start inside the country instead of in Qatar.
Each choice has a cost, because none of the resources it would use is free: a year spent preparing to leave the list is a year of officials’ time not spent on something else, and a rupee spent sheltering a young factory is a rupee not spent on a school. The book began with three questions every society answers: what to make, how to make it, and who gets it (Chapter 1). Nepal answers them again every year, in its budget, its laws and the millions of small sums like Aman’s. Economics can say what each answer is likely to cost and who is likely to pay. It can’t say which answer is right. That part belongs to the people sitting on the bench, and now to the reader.
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