On her best day Anshu sells about 280 glasses of tea at Rs. 25 each, and takes in Rs. 7,000. By evening nearly all of it is owed to someone. Here is where it goes, with the made-up numbers of her shop.
| Where the Rs. 7,000 goes | Rs. a day |
|---|---|
| Milk, tea leaf, sugar and gas, bought from other businesses | 2,800 |
| The room | 500 |
| The stove, pans and glasses wearing out, and interest on her loan | 100 |
| Two helpers, Sujan and one more | 1,400 |
| Anshu’s own day, at what she could earn in someone else’s shop | 700 |
| What is left | 1,500 |
The first line hides a long chain. The Rs. 2,800 goes to a dairy, a tea garden, a sugar mill and a gas company, and each of them pays its own rent, its own workers and its own lenders out of it. Follow any rupee far enough and it ends with someone who owns land, lent money, worked, or took a chance on a business. Those are the four factors of production, and their payments have old names: rent, लगान, for land; interest, ब्याज, for capital; wages, ज्याला, for labor; and profit, नाफा, for enterprise. Everything made is paid out to someone, and this chapter is about how much each one gets.
The plain answer is that each of the four payments is a price, set by demand and supply like the price of tea. The demand comes from what the factor helps to make. Anshu doesn’t take on a helper for his own sake; she wants the glasses he adds. With Anshu and Sujan at work, a third person adds 80 glasses a day. Each sells for Rs. 25 and needs Rs. 10 of milk and sugar, so those glasses bring in Rs. 1,200 more than their ingredients, and the person costs Rs. 700. She hires him. A fourth would add only 35 glasses, worth Rs. 525 over their ingredients, so she doesn’t. And if a machine could do the third person’s work for less than Rs. 700 a day, she would buy the machine instead. If tea sold for Rs. 30, though, the fourth person would add exactly Rs. 700 and she might take him on, and if wages rose to Rs. 1,300 a day, even the third would stop paying. Economists call this a derived demand: the demand for workers, rooms and loans is derived from the demand for what they make. A firm goes on hiring while what one more worker adds to its takings, after paying for the materials he uses, is more than his wage. Economists call what he adds his marginal revenue product.
So every firm wants more of a factor when it is cheaper, and more when what it makes sells well. Where the four differ is in the supply. Land is just there, and no one can make more of it. Lending means waiting for your money. Work needs a person, with whatever skill she has. And profit isn’t agreed with anyone in advance at all. It is what is left, and it can be less than nothing.
Rent
In everyday speech rent is what a tenant pays an owner: Anshu’s Rs. 15,000 a month for the room, agreed in a lease. Nepal’s books call that contract rent, ठेक्का लगान, or gross rent, कुल लगान. Economists also use the word for something narrower, and the idea goes back to an Englishman, David Ricardo, in 1817.
Picture a valley being settled. At first there is more good land than people, so they farm only the best fields, and nobody pays anything to use them, any more than anyone pays for air. As the people grow in number, they need more grain, and they start farming worse land too, which gives less for the same seed and the same days of work. Now the best fields are worth something extra. Grain must sell for enough to pay for farming the poorest field in use, or no one would farm it, so at that price the better fields earn more than their seed and work cost. That extra is rent. A farmer will pay it to the owner, because a good field at that rent is no worse a deal than a poor field for nothing.
Rent grows on a single field in the same way. A second round of seed, manure and work on the best field gives more grain, but less than the first round did, and a third gives less again. Farmers stop adding rounds when the next one would only just pay for itself, so the rent is what the earlier rounds grow above the last. Nepal’s books call the first way of growing more extensive cultivation, विस्तृत खेती, farming more land, and the second intensive cultivation, गहन खेती, farming the same land harder. Ricardo worked through both.
Ricardo drew a sharp conclusion from all this. “Corn is not high because a rent is paid,” he wrote, “but a rent is paid because corn is high.” The price of grain is set by the cost of growing it on the worst land anyone has to farm. Rent only soaks up the advantage of the better land. Grain would be no cheaper, he agreed, if every landlord gave up his rent; some farmers would simply live better.
Ricardo knew that fertility wasn’t the only advantage. Rent appears, he wrote, as land of a poorer quality, “or less advantageously situated”, comes into use. In a town it is nearly all about where the land is. A few square meters on a busy road in Kathmandu earn far more than a bigger plot up a quiet lane, not because the soil is better but because a shop there has people walking past all day. Anshu’s Rs. 500 a day is partly a payment for the customers at her door.
His theory has its critics. He called rent a payment for “the original and indestructible powers of the soil”, but soil isn’t indestructible: terraces and manure improve it, and floods and careless farming wash it away. Land has many uses, not only crops. And the same surplus turns up with things other than land. So economists now use economic rent, आर्थिक लगान, for any payment above the least it would take to keep something in its present use. Suppose the shop down the road would pay Sujan Rs. 20,000 a month, so that is the least that keeps him with Anshu. She pays him Rs. 21,000, and Rs. 1,000 of it is economic rent. A singer who would perform for Rs. 20,000 a show but is paid Rs. 200,000, because only she sings like that, earns most of her fee as economic rent. It comes from being scarce, as a good field is.
Interest
A loan lets someone use money now that they would otherwise have to wait years to save. Interest is the price of that: what the borrower pays, and the lender gets, for the use of money over time.
The interest written on a loan pays for more than the money. Nepal’s commercial banks charged borrowers 6.31% a year on average in mid-October 2026. In Koshi Province in 2021, families who borrowed to send someone abroad for work paid 27% a year on average, and 33% to moneylenders. Same rupees, very different prices, because the lender is also paid for the risk that the money never comes back, for the work of keeping accounts and chasing payments, and for the trouble of having it tied up. Nepal’s books call the whole of it gross interest, कुल ब्याज, and the price of the money alone net interest, खुद ब्याज. The net part is closest to what the safest borrower pays. Banks paid savers 3.07% on their deposits that month, and lent the money on at about twice that.
What sets the price of the money itself? The older answer, now called the classical theory of interest, treats it like any market. Savers supply money to lend, and more of it at a higher rate, since a higher reward makes waiting more worthwhile. Businesses want to borrow for new machines and buildings, and less of it at a higher rate, since fewer projects earn enough to pay it. The rate settles where the money savers offer is just what borrowers want, and a rate above that leaves money unlent, which pushes it down, as a glut of tomatoes pushes their price down.
The English economist John Maynard Keynes thought this left something out. He pointed out that saving alone earns nothing. A family that saves and keeps the cash at home gets no interest, though it has saved just as much. What earns interest is giving up the money for a while, so that you can’t reach it if you suddenly need it: “the rate of interest is the reward for parting with liquidity for a specified period.” He also argued that how much people save depends mostly on how much they earn, not on the rate. Both views are still taught, and a later chapter comes back to who sets interest rates today.
One more thing matters to a saver: what the money will buy when it comes back. In the year to mid-October 2026 prices in Nepal rose 6.37%, faster than the 3.07% deposits paid. A year’s deposit at those rates comes back as more rupees that buy about 3% less.
Wages
A wage is what an employer pays for work, by the hour, the day or the month. Here too there are two ways to count. The money wage, मौद्रिक ज्याला, is the number of rupees. The real wage, वास्तविक ज्याला, is what those rupees buy. Nepal’s books work it out by dividing the money wage by the price level, an index of what things cost, and multiplying by 100, and they count the extras an employer gives, such as housing or meals, as part of the real wage too. So do the hours, how safe and steady the work is, and the chance of rising in it: two jobs at the same pay are not worth the same if one is twelve hours a day in a hot kitchen.
The difference shows in Nepal’s minimum wage. From mid-July 2023 it was Rs. 17,300 a month, and from mid-July 2025 Rs. 19,550, a rise of 13%. Over those same two years prices rose about 6%, so the real minimum wage rose only about 7%. The law sets that floor, and its arguments wait for a later chapter.
Why does a surgeon earn many times what a farmer earns, when the farmer may work longer days? Part of the answer is on the demand side: what an hour of a surgeon’s work brings in, as Anshu’s helper is worth what his 80 glasses bring in. People pay a great deal to be made well. The other part is supply. Few people can do surgery, and becoming a surgeon takes many years of study, so few offer the work.
Adam Smith, the Scottish economist, listed five things that make some work pay more than other work, and they still fit. Unpleasant work pays more: “the most detestable of all employments, that of public executioner,” he noticed, was better paid for the work done than any common trade. Work that is hard and costly to learn pays more, as for lawyers and doctors. Work that comes and goes pays more by the day, to cover the days without it. Work that needs trust pays more: “We trust our health to the physician.” And work where few succeed pays the winners more. Put a son to a shoemaker, Smith wrote, and he will surely learn to make shoes; send him to study law, and “it is at least twenty to one” that he will ever live by it.
Where a person works matters as much as what she does. A worker who goes from Nepal to work abroad earns, on average, about three times as much. He hasn’t suddenly grown more skilled; an hour of his work simply brings in more where he has gone. Workers moving to where they are paid more, from one place or one kind of job to another, is part of how wages are set. So are bargaining, since workers who negotiate together in a trade union can win more than one alone (Nepal’s Constitution gives every worker that right, in Article 34), and the law, which sets the minimum wage. And some gaps have nothing to do with the work, such as women paid less than men for the same job, which a later chapter takes up.
Two older ideas about wages are still in the books, mostly as history. The first is the subsistence theory. Ricardo held that the natural price of labor was just enough for workers to live and raise the next generation of workers, “without either increase or diminution.” If wages rose above it, families would grow, more workers would compete for jobs, and wages would fall back. If wages fell below it, hunger and disease would thin the numbers until they rose again. Later the German socialist Ferdinand Lassalle called it “the iron and cruel law” that rules wages, and it has been known as the iron law of wages ever since. Yet Ricardo himself allowed that in a growing economy wages could stay above that level “for an indefinite period”, and that what counts as enough to live on depends on “the habits and customs of the people”. Since then, real wages in most countries have risen far above subsistence, and richer families have had fewer children, not more.
The second is the wages fund theory. It said that at any moment a fixed sum was set aside to pay workers, so the average wage was that sum divided by the number of workers, and nothing a union did could raise it for all of them. The English philosopher and economist John Stuart Mill gave it its best-known form. Twenty years later he gave it up in public, in a review of another man’s book: “I must plead guilty to having, along with the world in general, accepted the theory without the qualifications and limitations necessary to make it admissible.” An employer, he saw, could pay more out of his own spending and savings; there was no fixed fund. What replaced both theories is the derived demand at the start of this chapter, set against the supply of workers with each skill.
Profit
Rent, interest and wages are agreed before any tea is sold. Anshu signs a lease, borrows at a rate, and tells Sujan his pay. Profit isn’t agreed with anyone. It is what is left after the others are paid, so it can be large, small, nothing, or a loss.
How large depends on what is counted. Anshu’s account book takes away only what she actually paid out, the explicit costs, and shows Rs. 2,200 a day. Nepal’s books call that gross profit, कुल नाफा. But she also uses things she doesn’t pay for, above all her own day, which could have earned Rs. 700 in someone else’s shop. Take those implicit costs away too and her net profit, खुद नाफा, is Rs. 1,500 a day. That net profit is the economist’s profit. If it fell to nothing, she would still be earning what her time could earn elsewhere, which is called normal profit, enough to keep her in the business. As tea shops open beside hers, competition tends to push it down toward that.
Why should the owner get what is left? The American economist Frederick Hawley answered that profit is the reward for risk. The owner commits to paying everyone else whatever happens, and nobody would do that for nothing.
A generation later another American economist, Frank Knight, argued that this answer misses something. Some risks can be measured. No one knows whether Anshu’s shop will burn down this year, but across thousands of shops the number of fires each year is known well enough that she can pay an insurance company a small, fixed sum to carry the risk. Then the risk is just another cost. What can’t be insured is the uncertain: whether a new road will move the bus stop away from her door, whether a café will open across the street, whether customers will like the ginger tea she plans to add. Nobody has a table of chances for those. Profit, Knight argued, is the reward for facing that kind of uncertainty, and for judging it well. Nepal’s books add that it rewards trying something new, which is always uncertain.
So the money a business takes in is shared four ways. Land earns rent, a surplus that comes from being better placed or more fertile than the poorest land in use. Capital earns interest, the price of waiting and of the risk that the money won’t come back. Work earns a wage, set by what it adds and how few can do it. And the person who brings them together keeps the profit, whatever is left, as the reward for facing an uncertain future. Add up the rent, interest, wages and profit paid by every shop, farm and factory in Nepal and the total is the income of the whole country, which is where the book goes next.
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