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Cooked Books

Chapter 28 · Keeping Everyone Honest

In this chapter 5 sections
  1. Where a false profit has to go
  2. Income before it is earned
  3. Costs dressed as assets
  4. Cash that isn’t there
  5. What an accountant signs up to

On 7 January 2009 the chairman of Satyam Computer Services, a large Indian software company in Hyderabad, sent a letter to his board. “It is with deep regret, and tremendous burden that I am carrying on my conscience,” Ramalinga Raju began, and then he listed some numbers. The company’s balance sheet showed Rs. 5,361 crore of cash and money in banks. Rs. 5,040 crore of it did not exist. For the three months to September, Satyam had reported sales of Rs. 2,700 crore and an operating profit of 24 percent of them. The real sales were Rs. 2,112 crore, and the real figure was 3 percent. It had started, he wrote, as a small gap between the real profit and the one in the books, and it had grown every year. “It was like riding a tiger, not knowing how to get off without being eaten.”

Satyam’s books had balanced, every one of those years. Its debits had equaled its credits, its balance sheet had come out equal on both sides, and its auditors had signed. One sentence in Raju’s letter says how that was possible, and it explains nearly every case of cooked books there has ever been. The gap in the balance sheet, he wrote, “has arisen purely on account of inflated profits.”

Where a false profit has to go

Double entry checks one thing very well. Every entry has two sides of the same amount, so if a clerk writes Rs. 5,400 on one page and Rs. 4,500 on the other, the totals disagree and someone goes looking. What double entry can’t check is whether the thing written down ever happened. Tell the books that a customer bought Rs. 100,000 of paint, and they will record it twice, neatly, on the right pages, and balance to the rupee. The method never lies. It can be fed lies.

But the same habit leaves a trail. A profit is simply the owner’s share of a business growing, so a profit that isn’t real makes the owner’s share bigger than it is. The books still have to balance, so something on the other side must grow with it: an asset that is bigger than it should be, or a debt that is smaller. A false profit always has to be parked somewhere on the balance sheet. There are not many places to park it, and almost every fraud in the books uses one of three. Income is counted before it has been earned. A cost is counted as if it were something the business owns. Or an asset, most boldly the cash itself, is written into the books when it isn’t there.

Each is easiest to see in a small shop. Suppose, for a moment, that Yasmin wanted her first year to look better than it was. She didn’t; her real first year made a profit of Rs. 181,000, and her balance sheet came to Rs. 759,400 on each side. But here is what each of the three tricks would have done to it.

Yasmin’s first year Profit, Rs. On the other side Each side, Rs.
As it really was 181,000 nothing changes 759,400
The school’s Rs. 40,000 kept in sales 221,000 the debt to the school gone 759,400
The rent called a shop fit-out 343,000 a fit-out asset of 162,000 921,400
Rs. 119,000 of sales that never happened, “paid” into the bank 300,000 the bank balance 119,000 too high 878,400

Every line balances. The made-up profit is always matched, rupee for rupee, by a line on the balance sheet that is wrong. That is where a careful outsider looks.

Income before it is earned

On असार 25 of her first year a school paid Yasmin Rs. 40,000 for paint for its new classrooms, to be delivered in साउन. Until the paint goes out, the money is something the shop owes the school, not income, and on the last day of the year she made the entry that says so. Suppose she hadn’t. The Rs. 40,000 would stay in the year’s sales, the profit would come out at Rs. 221,000 instead of Rs. 181,000, and the debt to the school would vanish from the balance sheet. Both sides would still come to Rs. 759,400.

The paint still has to go out in साउन, though, and when it does there will be no sale to go with it. The second year’s profit will be Rs. 40,000 lower than it should be. Income counted early is borrowed from the next year. To keep the next year looking as good, a business that starts borrowing this way has to borrow more, and then more again. Raju’s letter describes the same pull: what began as a “marginal gap” between the real profit and the reported one “continued to grow over the years.”

The famous case is Enron, an American energy company that had risen to seventh on Fortune magazine’s list of America’s biggest companies. In April 2000 its broadband business signed an agreement with a large chain of video-rental shops to stream films to people’s homes, so that they could watch whenever they liked. Neither side could do it yet. Enron didn’t have the technology to send films over its network, and the chain didn’t have the right to send new films over the Internet at all. According to a complaint filed later by America’s stock market regulator, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the broadband business went looking for a way to take profit from the deal at once.

The plan had a code name, Braveheart. Its managers estimated how much money the deal would bring in over its whole life. They set up a joint venture, gave it the agreement, and sold part of their share in it to a financial institution, for cash worth what part of those future earnings would be worth today. Then they recorded the earnings as if they had been made at the moment of the sale. Enron counted $53 million of profit from Braveheart in the last three months of 2000 and $58 million in the first three months of 2001, from a service that was still being tested. The commission charged two of the managers in 2003, and its complaint called the whole deal a sham: Enron had quietly promised both the joint venture’s partner and the institution that they couldn’t lose, so nothing had really been sold. In the commission’s telling, it was a loan dressed up as a sale, and its money had been counted as profit.

Braveheart was a small part of Enron. In October 2001 the company announced a charge of $544 million against its profits and cut its owners’ share by $1.2 billion, all to do with a partnership run by its own chief financial officer. Less than a month later it said its accounts going back to 1997 were wrong. Its board’s own investigators found that deals with that partnership had made Enron’s reported profits from the middle of 2000 to September 2001 almost $1 billion higher than they should have been. In December 2001 it was bankrupt.

Its auditor went down with it. Through October and November 2001, as Enron’s trouble became public, the staff of Arthur Andersen working on Enron destroyed papers under what the firm called its document retention policy, until, once the regulator’s demand for records had arrived, the lead partner’s secretary sent round an email: “No more shredding … We have been officially served for our documents.” In June 2002 a jury found the firm guilty of obstructing justice. In 2005 the Supreme Court of the United States reversed the conviction, unanimously, because the judge’s instructions had let the jury convict without finding that the firm knew it was doing wrong. By then it hardly mattered. A firm that had once had 28,000 people in the United States was down to about 200.

Enron’s two former chief executives were tried together in Houston. In May 2006 a jury convicted Jeffrey Skilling on 19 counts, among them securities fraud, conspiracy and lying to the company’s auditors, and Kenneth Lay, the company’s chairman, on all six counts the jury heard against him. Lay died that July, before he could be sentenced, and in October a judge wiped out his conviction, because a dead man can no longer appeal. Skilling was sentenced to 24 years and 4 months, later cut to 14; his convictions were upheld on appeal.

Costs dressed as assets

The second trick turns a cost into something the business owns. Yasmin’s rent for the year was Rs. 180,000. Suppose she had written it into an account called “shop fit-out”, as if she had bought something lasting, and then charged only a tenth of it each year, as she does for her racks. This year’s costs would fall by Rs. 162,000, the profit would jump to Rs. 343,000, and the balance sheet would grow on both sides, by a fit-out asset nobody could ever touch.

This is the trick WorldCom played on an enormous scale, moving what it paid other telephone companies for their lines out of its costs and into its assets: about $3.85 billion in 2001 and the first three months of 2002, the regulator’s complaint said. How the entries were made, and how WorldCom’s own internal auditors found them in 2002, is told in Spending That Lasts.

How did it stay hidden so long? The investigators WorldCom’s board appointed answered in three parts. Many people in WorldCom’s finance and accounting departments knew something was wrong, and too few had the courage to say so to anyone who could stop it. The company’s controls were badly weak: they found hundreds of huge round-sum entries with no papers behind them, one of $560 million. And WorldCom’s auditor, Arthur Andersen again, rated it a client of the highest risk but never tested enough to find the fraud, while some WorldCom staff kept from it what it needed and changed papers before it saw them. Behind all of it, the investigators wrote, was a company that put “making the numbers above all else”, and the man they named as the source of that culture was its chief executive, Bernard Ebbers.

Ebbers said he had known nothing about the accounting. His chief financial officer, Scott Sullivan, the man who had ordered the entries, pleaded guilty in March 2004, on the day Ebbers was charged, and became the main witness against him. In March 2005 a jury in New York convicted Ebbers on all nine counts, and that July he was sentenced to 25 years in prison.

Cash that isn’t there

A false profit parked as money owed by customers, or as an asset that is really a cost, can survive a long time. But it is uncomfortable. Customers who owe money and never pay begin to look odd, and an asset has to be something. The boldest way out is to say the money has arrived.

Suppose Yasmin wanted a profit of Rs. 300,000 instead of her real Rs. 181,000. She could write in Rs. 119,000 of sales on credit to customers who never bought anything, with the paint still on the racks, counted in the stock as before. The profit would rise to Rs. 300,000 and the debts owed to her would rise by the same amount. Then, to tidy away those debts, she could write that the customers had paid into the bank. Her books would now show Rs. 175,800 in the bank. The bank itself would have Rs. 56,800. Two-thirds of the balance in her books would be money that isn’t there.

That is Satyam, on a scale hundreds of thousands of times bigger. America’s Securities and Exchange Commission, which oversaw Satyam because its shares also traded in New York, charged in 2011 that people inside the company had made more than 6,000 false sales invoices and fake bank statements to match. Over five years the cash and cash-like balances that didn’t exist had grown past a billion dollars, half of everything the company said it owned. Raju’s letter has the same shape as Yasmin’s made-up year: the inflated cash of Rs. 5,040 crore, Rs. 376 crore of interest said to be owed on it, also not there, and Rs. 490 crore too much owed by customers.

A cash balance is about the easiest thing in a set of books to check. An auditor writes to the bank and asks it to say, directly to the auditor, how much the business has there. In a settlement with the auditors’ Indian firms, the commission found that their staff had routinely let the company itself handle those letters to the banks and the answers that came back. Ten people were convicted in a special court in Hyderabad in April 2015, Raju and his brother among them, and two of the auditors as well, each sentenced to seven years.

The same trick has turned up wherever someone thought nobody would ask the bank. An Italian dairy company, Parmalat, showed close to four billion euros in a bank account in New York that turned out not to exist, a story told in The Balance Sheet. The most recent large case is still in court.

Wirecard was a German payments company that handled card payments for shops on the Internet. In 2018 it joined the index of Germany’s thirty biggest companies, valued at €24 billion. For years newspaper reporters had questioned its figures, and the German financial regulator’s answer was to investigate the reporters and ban bets against the company’s shares. In June 2020 its auditors refused to sign its accounts for 2019. They couldn’t find €1.9 billion that the company said was held in trust accounts at two banks in the Philippines, and the two banks said Wirecard wasn’t their customer. Within days the company said the money may not exist at all, and on 25 June it applied to a Munich court to be declared insolvent. Its creditors have claimed about €15 billion, and in five years the administrator dealing with what was left had collected about €650 million.

Germany’s auditor oversight body found in 2023 that the audits of 2016 to 2018 had broken the auditors’ professional duties. It fined the audit firm €500,000 and banned it for two years from taking on new audits of public-interest companies, such as listed companies and banks, and fined five of its auditors; they could appeal. The company’s former chief executive has been on trial in Munich since December 2022 with two other former managers, accused among other things of fraud as part of a gang and of false accounts. He denies it. In his account the business behind the €1.9 billion, payments handled through partner firms abroad, was real, and a gang around another manager, who fled, took its money and moved it elsewhere. The administrator, giving evidence in 2025, said that was out of the question: his team had found nothing to show that business had ever existed. As of November 2026 no verdict had been given.

What an accountant signs up to

So the double entry didn’t fail in any of these cases. It did exactly what it was built to do, and recorded every lie on both sides. What failed was people. Sometimes the person at the top wanted numbers that the business couldn’t give. Sometimes the people who knew stayed quiet. Sometimes the outsiders who were paid to check didn’t check the one thing that would have shown it: the shelves, the papers behind an entry, the bank.

That is why accounting is a profession with a code of ethics, and why the code is not a side matter. The people who suffer from cooked books are not only the shareholders. When the truth came out, almost 6,000 people at Wirecard were working for a company that had applied to be declared insolvent, and the people who worked for Andersen lost their firm, whatever audits they had worked on. Investors, lenders, workers and governments all decide what to do from what the accounts say, and none of them can check the books for themselves.

The code that many countries’ accountants follow is written by an international board, the International Ethics Standards Board for Accountants, and Nepal’s chartered accountants follow it too, since the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nepal adopted it as its own Code of Ethics in 2023. It rests on five fundamental principles. Integrity, इमानदारिता: to be straightforward and honest in every professional dealing. Objectivity, वस्तुनिष्ठता: not to let bias, a conflict of interest or undue influence from anyone bend a judgment. Professional competence and due care, पेसागत सक्षमता र उचित सतर्कता: to know the work, keep up with it and do it carefully. Confidentiality, गोपनीयता: to keep what the work reveals to oneself, unless the law or a professional duty says to speak. And professional behavior, व्यावसायिक आचरण: to obey the law, act in the public interest and avoid anything that might bring the profession into disrepute. Nepal’s school books for accounting add two more to the list, transparency, पारदर्शिता, which means showing the facts that matter openly, and fairness, न्याय, treating everyone the accounts touch alike.

The code doesn’t leave these as fine words. An accountant, it says, must not knowingly be associated with a report that contains a materially false or misleading statement, and one who finds that they have been must step away from it. And it names pressure plainly, as the thing that breaks people: an accountant must not let pressure from others lead them to break the principles, nor put that pressure on anyone else. Among its examples of such pressure is exactly the one behind every case in this chapter, pressure to report misleading results to meet what investors, analysts or lenders expect.

Raju described his fraud as a small gap between the real profit and the one in the books that grew every year, and WorldCom’s investigators found a company that put making the numbers above everything. Neither began with someone deciding to steal a billion dollars. The tricks that take money straight from ordinary people, the schemes that promise a fortune a week, are a different family, and Thinking Clearly, for the Curious follows how they are built.

What to keep from all this is short. Double entry is a check that the books agree with themselves, not with the world, so it can be fed a lie and will balance it perfectly. But a false profit has to sit somewhere on the balance sheet: as income counted before it is earned, as a cost dressed up as an asset, or as cash and debts that aren’t there. The checks that find it are the ones that go outside the books, to the racks, the papers and the bank, and the people who make them are bound by a code that asks, above everything, for honesty under pressure.

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