Around 1920 a young Swiss scientist called Jean Piaget was working in Paris. The psychologist Théodore Simon had asked him to try out a set of English reasoning questions on Paris schoolchildren. The job was to give them to many children and find out what was usual at each age. Piaget found the wrong answers more interesting. Children of the same age kept making the same mistakes, mistakes older children didn’t make, and Piaget began asking them how they had got there, in conversations modeled on the way a psychiatrist questions a patient. It was, he wrote later, “much more interesting to try to find the reasons for the failures.” At last, he said, he had found his field.
What he found in the decades that followed changed how the world thinks about children. A child isn’t a small adult who knows fewer facts. A child thinks in a different way, and the way changes as the child grows.
So how does a child come to think? The plain answer has three parts. A child builds an understanding of the world for itself, by handling things, trying ideas out and changing them when they don’t fit. It builds faster with help, from people who know a little more. And it gets words, which become some of its most useful tools. Thinking itself is all the work the mind does on what it knows, inside, where nobody can see it except through what a person then says or does. It works on stand-ins for things: pictures in the mind, ideas of kinds of things, and symbols such as words and numbers, which let a child think about a goat that isn’t in the room.
Piaget’s ladder
Piaget’s central idea is that children are builders. Each child makes its own small models of how things go, which he called schemas: what a ball does, what a dog is, what happens when you let go of a cup. New experiences are fitted into the models a child already has. A small child who knows cows may call the first buffalo she sees a cow. When the new thing won’t fit, the model has to change, and a new idea of buffalo is made. Piaget called the first assimilation and the second accommodation, and the world, for him, is learned by a long back and forth between the two.
He also thought the building goes in stages, each a different kind of thinking. Every child, he said, climbs the same four steps in the same order, at roughly the same ages.
For about the first two years a baby thinks with its senses and its hands. At first, Piaget said, a toy out of sight is simply gone, as far as the baby is concerned. Somewhere in the first year it learns that things go on existing when it can’t see them, which Piaget called object permanence.
From about two to six or seven, a child has symbols. A stick becomes a phone, a leaf becomes a plate, and a pile of mud becomes rice for a doll. Pretend play is thinking with stand-ins, and children of this age are very good at it. But their logic is held by how things look. Show a four-year-old two rows of six coins, side by side, and she’ll say they have the same. Spread one row out while she watches and she’ll say the longer row has more.
Piaget called the missing idea conservation: an amount stays the same when only its shape or spread changes. Children of this age, he said, also find it hard to see the world from someone else’s place, and give their own view instead, which he called egocentrism. His best-known test of it was a model of three mountains: the child looked at it from one side and was asked what someone sitting on another side would see.
From about seven to eleven, children can do in their heads what they could once only do with their hands: they understand that the spread-out row could be pushed back, and that nothing was added, so the number can’t have changed. They reason well about real things in front of them. Last, from about eleven or twelve, comes thinking about what isn’t there at all: what would happen if, ideas about ideas, algebra’s unknown x. Piaget himself thought not everyone reaches this last stage.
Nearly every course still teaches this ladder, Nepal’s included, and it deserves its place: the idea that children build their own understanding, rather than soaking up what they’re told, is now so common that it’s hard to see how new it was. The order of what children understand has held up well too.
What hasn’t held up so well is the ladder itself. Later research suggests that most of these changes come gradually, a little at a time, not in sudden steps. And many children can do more, earlier, than Piaget’s tests showed.
The tests themselves were part of the reason. Two psychologists once tried the coin test with a twist. Instead of the grown-up spreading out the row, a “naughty” teddy bear did it, as if by accident. More children now said the rows still had the same. Perhaps, in the usual test, a child thinks: an adult has just changed the row on purpose and asked me again, so the answer must be different now. Then the story got more complicated. A later team got the same result, and when they made the test stricter, the teddy still made a difference, though less of one. Another, with a toy fox in the teddy’s place, found no difference at all. So the teddy hasn’t settled it, but it showed something that has lasted: a child’s answer depends on what the child thinks the question is.
Babies’ knowledge has had a stormier time. The psychologist Renée Baillargeon and her colleagues showed five-month-olds a screen that swung up and over like a drawbridge, with a box behind it. In one version the screen seemed to swing right through the box, which ought to be impossible. The babies looked longer at it, and the team read this as surprise: the babies must have known that the box was still there behind the screen, earlier than Piaget thought babies understood that. Later another team repeated it and found that the babies also looked longer at the full swing when there was no box at all. Perhaps they simply liked the bigger movement. How much babies know is still argued, partly because a long look can mean many things.
Learning with others
In the Soviet Union, at about the same time, Lev Vygotsky had a different picture. Piaget’s child is a lone scientist, working things out by experiment. Vygotsky’s child grows up among people, and learns first in the company of others what it will later do alone.
He made the point with two imaginary children. Test them both, and both turn out to be at the level of an ordinary seven-year-old. Now help them, with a question that leads somewhere, an example, a demonstration. One child, with that help, can now pass tests meant for nine-year-olds. The other gets only six months further. On their own the two look the same; what they can do with help shows they aren’t. Vygotsky called that gap the zone of proximal development. “What the child can do today with the help of adults,” he wrote, “it will be able to carry out tomorrow on its own.”
So, he argued, good teaching runs a little ahead of the child, in that zone: not what the child can already do, and not what is far out of reach. Psychologists later gave such help a name, scaffolding, like the bamboo poles round a new building, which come down once the walls can stand. The word isn’t Vygotsky’s; it came from a study of tutoring children in 1976.
The two men have given their names to two views of learning that Nepal’s Grade 11 courses in psychology and child development teach. In cognitive constructivism, after Piaget, each learner builds understanding for themselves. In social constructivism, after Vygotsky, understanding is built between people first. Most psychologists today would say both happen.
They also disagreed about language. For Piaget, thought came first: a baby thinks with its hands long before it has words, and words only mean something once the ideas behind them are there. For Vygotsky, thought and speech began apart and joined at about two, after which a child starts talking itself through things, and the talk slowly goes silent and inward, to become the voice in your head.
Knowing that others can be wrong
Here is a test that young children fail in a way that is hard to forget. A child watches a little play with two dolls. Sally puts her marble in her basket and goes out. While she’s away, Anne moves the marble into her own box. Sally comes back. Where will she look for her marble?
A child of three will usually say: in the box, because that’s where it is. A child of five usually says: in the basket, because that’s where Sally thinks it is. To pass, a child has to understand that other people have minds of their own, which can hold a belief that is false. Psychologists call this understanding a theory of mind, and the doll play and others like it, false-belief tests.
This one has held up very well. One team pooled 178 studies of such tests. The details of the story made some difference, but the same pattern held across countries and versions: younger preschoolers mostly fail, older ones mostly pass. Another gave the same test in the same way in Canada, India, Peru, Samoa and Thailand, and in all five children crossed over at about the age of five.
Then Baillargeon and a colleague reported something startling. Babies of fifteen months, watching a woman look for a toy, seemed to expect her to search where she falsely believed it was, judging by how long they looked. If that were true, the knowledge was there years before children could say it. But attempts to repeat these looking studies have often failed. In a recent large test run across many laboratories, not yet published in a journal, the eyes of 703 adults showed they could tell a person who knew where something was from one who didn’t, but the eyes of 521 toddlers didn’t make that distinction as predicted. That test was of knowing and not knowing, not false beliefs, so the question isn’t settled. What is solid is what children say, at about four or five.
What helps a child get there? One clue comes from deaf children. A deaf child born to deaf parents grows up with sign language from the start, and a deaf child born to hearing parents is often late to a full language. In a study of 176 deaf children in the United States, the children of hearing parents were well behind on false-belief tests, whether they signed or spoke. The children of deaf families did exactly as well as hearing children. And the more of a language a child had, the better it did, even on tests that needed few words. It looks as if talk is one of the ways children find out that other people have minds: hearing about what people want, think and believe.
How children get words
Language starts with listening. A baby starts out able to hear differences between sounds that its own language doesn’t use, and it learns to stop hearing the ones its own language doesn’t use.
Hindi makes a difference that English doesn’t, between त and ट: one with the tongue on the teeth, the other with it curled further back. English-speaking adults can hardly hear it, and two psychologists in Canada, Janet Werker and Richard Tees, asked when that deafness begins. They taught babies from English-speaking homes to turn their heads to a toy whenever a repeated Hindi syllable changed from the one to the other.
At six to eight months, 11 of 12 babies could tell them apart. By ten to twelve months only 2 of 10 could. The groups were small, but the pattern has held in later studies: by their first birthday babies have tuned their ears to the language around them, and lost some of what they were born with. Nepali makes much the same difference between त and ट. Nobody has tested Nepali babies, but our guess is that a baby growing up with Nepali keeps it, as the few babies from Hindi-speaking homes did.
The rest comes in a familiar order, everywhere. Babies coo, then babble: “ba-ba-ba”, “da-da-da”. They point. First words come somewhere between a year and eighteen months, then two words together, “more milk”, “papa gone”, then longer sentences, and by about three to five a child is holding real conversations. Along the way a child makes a first guess at a new word from hearing it once and fills in its meaning over many more meetings.
The mistakes show that children aren’t simply copying. An English-speaking child who has always heard “went” starts saying “goed” and “mouses”, which no adult says. The child has found a rule, add -ed for the past and -s for more than one, and is using it everywhere, even where English breaks it. The behaviorist B. F. Skinner held that language is learned like anything else, by reward. Noam Chomsky answered that children learn far more, far faster, than reward could teach, so something in the human brain must be ready for language.
The strongest case for the brain’s readiness comes from Nicaragua. Over about 25 years from the late 1970s, deaf children there created a new sign language among themselves. Each new group of young children who learned it made the signing more like a full language, breaking events into separate parts and putting them in order by rules that the gestures of the hearing people around them didn’t follow. Children, given a chance, build the structure of a language themselves.
What words do for thinking
So what are a child’s tools of thought, once it has them? The first is pictures in the mind. In a famous experiment people were shown drawings of two blocky shapes and asked whether they were the same shape turned around. The more one was turned from the other, the longer people took, in a straight line, as if they were turning a picture in their heads at a steady speed. The second is concepts, the ideas of a kind of thing that let you treat a hundred different dogs as dogs. Concepts have centers and edges. Asked how well each of fifty or sixty things fitted their idea of furniture, people in an American study put chair and sofa at the top and a telephone near the bottom. The third is symbols, words and numbers above all, which let you hold an idea steady, share it and build on it.
Does the language you speak change how you think? The American linguist Benjamin Lee Whorf argued that it does, even that language decides what you can think. Psychologists now reject that strong version: people can think thoughts their language has no word for. The interesting question is the weaker one. Does a language make some thoughts easier?
Sometimes, it seems. Russian has two everyday words for blue, one for light blues and one for dark, and Russian speakers asked to tell two blues apart were a little faster when the two fell on either side of that line. English speakers, shown the same colors, weren’t. And when the Russians were given a second task that kept their words busy, the advantage disappeared, while a second task with shapes didn’t remove it.
Number words are a stronger case. The Pirahã, a people of the Amazon, have no words for exact numbers, not even “one”. In tests they could match a line of objects to another line perfectly while both were in front of them, but when they had to remember how many there had been, they went wrong. Number words, the team concluded, don’t change how people see quantities. They are a tool, invented, for keeping hold of exactly how many.
Famous claims here need care. One study reported that Mandarin speakers, whose language also talks of earlier months as “up” and later ones as “down”, thought of time running vertically. Others tried six times to repeat it, and another team four times, and none found it.
In Nepal, growing up with more than one language is ordinary. The 2021 census counted more than 120 mother tongues, and Nepali is the mother tongue of about 45 people in 100, so more than half the country first spoke something else. The map of Nepal’s peoples and languages shows them place by place.
For years it was said that growing up with two languages also made you better at controlling your attention and switching between tasks, because managing two languages all day was thought to train it. Then a team went through talks given at scientific meetings from 1999 to 2012 and checked which ones were later published. Studies that found an advantage were the most likely to get into print, and studies that challenged it, the least. Once such missing studies were allowed for, the case shrank: a review of 152 studies of adults found a very small advantage that was gone after correcting for them, and a review of 143 comparisons in children found one so small that it gave little support to the claim. One kind of task, switching quickly from one rule to another, still showed a small edge in children. As a general boost to thinking, the famous bilingual advantage now has little support.
Two languages do cost a little in each. Toddlers learning two languages knew fewer words in each than children learning one, but about as many in total, and the more they heard of a language, the more of it they knew. Adults with two languages came up with slightly fewer words of one kind, against the clock, in one of their languages.
A child who speaks Tamang at home, Nepali at school and English in her books needs no extra advantage to make it worthwhile. Three languages are three ways of talking to people, three sets of songs and jokes, and the families and places that go with them. That is reason enough.
Piaget was right that a child is no empty adult, and right to look closely at the wrong answers. A child builds its world for itself, from what it handles and tries. Others help it climb, a little ahead of where it could go alone. Words come in their own order, from ears tuned to one language by the first birthday to grammar the child works out for itself, and they become tools for thinking, though they don’t decide what a person can think.
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