It is late on a Friday in a village in Dhanusha, and Kajal, who is made up, needs Rs. 50,000 by morning. Her father is in hospital in Janakpur and the hospital wants a deposit before it operates. The bank in the bazaar is shut until Sunday. When it opens it will want her citizenship certificate, proof of income she doesn’t have, perhaps land as security, and a week. The cooperative lends only to members who have saved for some months. Her relatives have already given what they had. But there is a man two houses down who lends, and he lends tonight. He knows her family, he needs no papers, and he will ask only that she write a note for the money and pay him Rs. 2,500 every month until she can return it. That is 5% a month. She takes it.
She is not being stupid. She is paying for three things a bank can’t sell her: speed, no papers, and a lender who will say yes when nobody else will. People everywhere pay heavily for those, and the poorer they are, the more they need them, because a poor family has no savings to fall back on and nothing a bank will take as security. This chapter is about what happens next: how such a loan can run away from the person who took it, what Nepal’s law says about it, and why an idea that won a Nobel Prize, lending to poor women in groups, was thought to be the way out, and what became of it in Nepal.
How the sums run away
Five percent a month sounds small. It is Rs. 5 for every Rs. 100, a month at a time. But Chapter 14 showed why “per what?” is the first question to ask, and a year has twelve months: 5% a month is 60% a year, six times the most that Nepal’s Civil Code allows on a loan written in a deed. An official in Sarlahi who heard such cases in 2023 said the borrowers were mostly poor people who had taken loans at 36 to 60% a year.
A family that pays the interest every month can still get free in time. The trouble begins when it can’t. Say the harvest fails and Kajal pays nothing for a year. The lender doesn’t wait with the old note. He asks her to sign a new one, for the money she borrowed plus the year’s interest, Rs. 80,000. From then on the 5% a month is charged on Rs. 80,000, not on Rs. 50,000. Interest has been added to the principal, and the next year’s interest is charged on the interest. It is compound interest, Chapter 10’s subject, and a good thing in a savings account. In a debt that nobody is paying, it is a machine that runs by itself.
The amber line in the picture is a loan of Rs. 1 lakh at 5% a month, its deed rewritten at the end of each year. After one year it says Rs. 1.6 lakh. After two, Rs. 2.56 lakh. After three, more than Rs. 4 lakh, and after five, more than Rs. 10 lakh, ten times what was borrowed. The blue line is what the law allows on the same loan: Rs. 1.5 lakh after five years, and never more than Rs. 2 lakh however long it runs. Real cases look like the amber line. Reports from the Tarai in 2023 told of a family that borrowed Rs. 3 lakh and was asked for Rs. 12 lakh, and another that borrowed Rs. 3.5 lakh and was asked for Rs. 15 lakh. That is four times the loan, which at 5% a month with a new deed each year takes about three years.
Then comes the land. A family that can’t pay Rs. 12 lakh is asked to sign over its field “as security”, or to write a deed that says it sold the field, and the field is gone. Nepalis came to call this kind of lending मिटर ब्याज (miṭar byāj), meter interest, and it was the land, more than the money, that brought it into the news.
What the law says, and the village
On paper the borrower was protected all along. Chapter 14 gave the Muluki Civil Code’s limits on a loan written in a deed: interest only if the deed says so, at most 10% a year, no interest on interest, and never more interest in all than the sum lent. The Code adds that a lender must give a receipt for every payment and hand back the deed when the loan is paid, and that a borrower may go to court over interest on interest, or above 10%, with no deadline. Every amber dot in the picture breaks the Code.
The trouble is the word “on paper”. A deed that says 5% a month would give the lender away, so such deeds were written another way: for a sum larger than was ever lent, or with the interest already folded into the principal on the day of lending, so that the paper shows Rs. 1.6 lakh where Rs. 1 lakh changed hands. Those are the very tricks the law later named one by one. The lender has the signed paper; a borrower who was given no receipts has nothing. In court the paper wins.
In 2023 people in the Tarai began to protest in large numbers, and the government answered with a commission led by a former judge. In a few months it took more than twenty thousand complaints, most from eight districts of Madhesh. Many lenders settled rather than risk prosecution, and some families got their land back: in one case reported in June that year, a lender who had asked for Rs. 15 lakh accepted Rs. 8 lakh and returned the land. An ordinance that May, and then an Act of Parliament in July 2023, changed the law itself.
The Act did two things. It added to the Civil Code that a loan deed needs a witness for each side. And it added a new crime to the Muluki Criminal Code, section 249क, “अनुचित लेनदेन गर्न नहुने”, no unfair lending. The section names the tricks one by one: a deed for money never lent, a deed for more than was lent, interest added to the principal when the loan is made or in a new deed later, no receipt for what was paid, interest taken beyond the sum lent, threats or violence to collect, and taking the borrower’s land on the strength of such a deal. The punishment is up to seven years in prison and a fine of up to Rs. 70,000, by how serious the case is. The lender is left with what he really lent and the lawful interest; anything taken above that goes back to the borrower, and a transfer of land made this way is void. The section speaks of private dealings, घरसार (gharsār) as the law calls them; banks and microfinance companies have rules of their own.
So the law changed. The village changed more slowly. Lenders who held deeds, and cheques signed blank, took borrowers to court for the full sum on the paper, while borrowers who had no receipts struggled to prove anything. A second commission was set up in 2024 and a third in 2025. Reports put the complaints to the three at sixty or seventy thousand, with only a small share settled, and police in one district said that about one in five of the cases they settled had turned out to be false. In July 2026 people set out on foot from Janakpur for Kathmandu, and the government agreed, among other things, to publish the three commissions’ reports, to treat deeds and cheques made from such lending as invalid, and to draft a special law with a court of its own. The agreement gave the Home Ministry three months to draft it.
Debts that held whole families
Loans that can never be paid off are older than any of these laws. In the western Tarai, for generations, a कमैया (kamaiyā) family worked a landlord’s land under a yearly bargain, borrowed when the grain ran out, and found the debt passed from father to son. Nepal’s History, Chapter 31, tells how the kamaiyas, nearly all of them Tharu, freed themselves and were declared free in July 2000. The Act that followed in 2002, the Kamaiya Labour (Prohibition) Act, canceled the debts outright: section 5 says a kamaiya does not have to repay them, section 6 voids every deed made for them, and section 7 orders a lender to return, within three months, anything taken as security.
In the far-western hills the same kind of debt held the हलिया (haliyā), “the one who plows”, landless families, most of them Dalit, who plowed a landlord’s fields to work off what they owed. The 2002 Act already names the हली among the workers it frees, but the haliyas were declared free, and their debts canceled, only on 6 September 2008, after their own campaign; two years on, the canceling was still slow. As with the kamaiyas, freedom came before land. Years later the International Labour Organization still found some former haliyas working for the same landlords, because they had no other living or still owed the old loans. In both cases the debt was not a sum to be repaid; it was a way of holding people, and the interest made sure the sum never shrank.
Lending in groups
After the famine of 1974 in Bangladesh, an economics professor named Muhammad Yunus, who found it hard to teach elegant theories beside so much hunger, went into Jobra, a village by his university, and made a list of the people there who owed money to moneylenders. There were 42 of them, and between them they owed US $27. He paid it himself. When the bank on the campus refused to lend to the poor, he stood guarantor for the loans himself. The poor, he said later, “paid back their loans, on time, every time!” Out of that came Grameen Bank, set up as a bank in 1983. By 2006 it was lending to nearly seven million people, 97 in 100 of them women, and that year Yunus and Grameen Bank shared the Nobel Peace Prize, “for their efforts to create economic and social development from below.”
The trick that made it work was the group. A bank won’t lend to the poor because it can’t tell a good borrower from a bad one, can’t watch what she does with the money, and has nothing to take if she doesn’t pay. A small group of women from the same village can do all three. They choose each other, so they don’t pick someone they know won’t pay. They meet, and see each other’s shops and goats. And in the classic version each stands behind the others’ loans, so if one doesn’t pay, the rest feel it. Neighbors’ knowledge and neighbors’ pressure take the place of land, the same collateral that held the ढुकुटी together in Chapter 17. It looked like a cure for the moneylender: small loans, no land needed, at a rate far below his.
In Nepal today, microfinance companies, लघुवित्त (laghubitta), are one of the four classes of institution that Nepal Rastra Bank licenses, class D, the one Chapter 12 left for this chapter. There are about fifty of them. In mid-October 2026 they had about 2.7 million borrowers and Rs. 543 billion out in loans, about Rs. 2 lakh a borrower on average; their members were organized into more than 1.5 million groups, meeting in nearly half a million centers. Most are retail companies that lend to people; a few are wholesale, lending to the others. Besides small loans for a business, up to Rs. 5 lakh a member with the group behind her and more against property, they take their members’ savings and lend for solar panels, biogas, cheap housing and work abroad.
How is a microfinance company different from a bank, and from a savings and credit cooperative? From a bank, in whom it serves and how. A bank lends to anyone who passes its checks, usually against land or a salary, and takes deposits from everyone. A microfinance company lends small sums to poor families through groups, and takes savings mostly from its own members; only two may take deposits from the public, and only two belong to the guarantee fund that protects bank deposits. It is licensed and inspected by the central bank, like a bank, and owned by shareholders, many of its shares traded on NEPSE. A cooperative, सहकारी, is owned by its members, one vote each. A savings and credit cooperative does that one trade; a multipurpose one runs several, but since the Act of 2017 may not make savings and credit its main trade. Either may take savings only from its members and lend only to them, and Chapter 12 told how it was registered rather than licensed, and what that cost many savers. Put simply: a bank serves everyone and is licensed; a microfinance company serves the poor through groups and is licensed; a cooperative serves its own members and is run by them.
When the cure was blamed
In 2023, the same year as the protests against मिटर ब्याज, another movement filled the roads to Kathmandu. Its members were borrowers of microfinance companies, many of them from the Tarai, and they demanded that the companies be shut and their loans written off. They said they paid far more than the advertised rate. When many came back in 2026, one woman told a reporter of loans of Rs. 1 lakh written on paper from which only Rs. 80,000 reached the borrower’s hands, with interest on the whole Rs. 1 lakh; she put what borrowers really paid at 36 to 52% a year. Loan officers, she said, came to collect before a month had passed; when she couldn’t pay, the others in her group lost savings and came to her house for her things; and companies kept opening branches and signing up people who already had a loan. One borrower told a reporter in 2026 of borrowing from eight or ten companies, each to repay another, and in the end from a moneylender.
The companies and the central bank told it differently. Interest was capped at 15% a year, they said, and in the first quarter of 2022/23 every company was within it; the central bank had already ordered companies to pay back Rs. 1.6 billion of fees charged above the limit. The cost of the money they lent had risen to about 13%, and several companies were losing money. Repayment had gone bad during Covid, and the central bank heard that some borrowers who could pay were holding back in the hope of a write-off. And both sides described the worst debts the same way, though they blamed different people for them: one family borrowing from many lenders at once. The companies had joined the Credit Information Bureau, the list every bank reads from Chapter 16, so a lender could see a borrower’s other loans; one company’s head said that lending to the same people only grew after that.
Both accounts can be true at once, and Chapter 14’s sums show how. A loan at 15% with a fee taken off at the start, and savings held back from it, costs more on the money actually received than its rate says. A borrower with five loans of Rs. 1 lakh at 15% owes Rs. 5 lakh at 15%, which is more than most small shops can carry. The rate can be within the law and the debt still be too much.
The central bank tightened the rules. A borrower may now have loans from at most two microfinance companies, and none at all from a bank or finance company. Nothing may be cut from a loan as savings, the service fee is at most 1.3%, the group’s meeting costs are the company’s, and collection may not shame or harass. Since July 2025 a company’s rate has been tied to its own cost of money, and may never be more than nine points above the commercial banks’ average base rate. The movement split in 2026, one side agreeing terms with the government and the other going on protesting in Kathmandu, and by mid-2026 nearly one loan in ten was bad.
What does the research say? In 2015 the economists Abhijit Banerjee, Dean Karlan and Jonathan Zinman gathered six careful studies, from Bosnia, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Morocco and Mongolia, in which microloans were offered to some places or people chosen by lot and not to others, so that the difference could be measured. They found “modestly positive, but not transformative, effects”. Fewer people borrowed than expected; those who did invested a little more in their businesses and had a little more freedom in how they spent; but on average neither their incomes nor their children’s schooling clearly rose. There was “little support” for the largest claims, and little for the harshest critics either, with hints that the loans were good for some borrowers and bad for others. None of those studies was in Nepal or of families with ten loans, but the picture fits: a useful tool, not a cure.
People borrow at terrible rates because they need money fast, have no papers and have nowhere else to go. What makes such a loan dangerous is less the rate than what happens when a payment is missed: interest added to the principal, a new deed, and in the end the land. Nepal’s law now forbids each of those tricks by name, but a borrower still needs receipts and witnesses to use it. Microfinance put the group in the place of land and brought small loans to millions, far cheaper than the moneylender’s; it also showed that cheap money, too easily given, can be borrowed from too many places at once. Before any loan, ask what it costs a year on the rupees actually received, who else the family owes, and what will be signed. A family in trouble with a private lender can go to the police or the District Administration Office; one in trouble with a microfinance company can go to its grievance officer and then to Nepal Rastra Bank. Neither is shameful: the law was changed for them.
Try this
- Using the picture, find how much the made-up loan’s deed says after three years at 5% a month, and what the law would allow after three years. How many times bigger is the first?
- Work out what Kajal’s Rs. 50,000 at 5% a month costs in interest in one year if she pays every month. Then work out what a bank loan at 12% a year would cost for the same year.
- A loan of Rs. 1 lakh at 15% a year hands over only Rs. 80,000, and interest is charged on the whole Rs. 1 lakh. Work out one year’s interest, then divide it by Rs. 80,000. What rate is that on the money received?
- Ask an older relative whether anyone in the village lent money at interest when they were young, and how it was written down.
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