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Where Savings Are Safe

Chapter 12 · Moving Money Forward

In this chapter 6 sections
  1. The list to look up first
  2. Why a guarantee at all
  3. How Nepal’s guarantee works
  4. Cooperatives: what they are for
  5. The collapse, as depositors saw it
  6. Try this

In the spring of 2023 a woman in Birendranagar, Surkhet, went every day to a locked door. She was 35 and worked for a daily wage, with four children and a husband who couldn’t work. Over five years she had put away about Rs. 50,000 at a local cooperative, saving for her children’s schooling, and it was all the family had saved. In February she heard a rumor that the cooperative was in trouble and went to ask. The staff told her the money was safe and not to believe rumors. In the last week of March the cooperative shut, and its staff could no longer be reached. About a dozen cooperatives and microfinance firms in the town closed that spring. Nothing we found says whether she ever got her money back.

She hadn’t done anything foolish. She had saved, which is the hard part, and she had saved somewhere near home, run by people of her own town. What she couldn’t know was the answer to one question, and it is the question to ask of any place that holds your money: if it fails, what happens?

The question sounds gloomy, but it has a precise answer for each kind of place, and the answers are very different. This chapter goes through them.

The list to look up first

Chapter 11 said that a deposit is a loan you make to a bank, and a loan is only as good as the borrower. So the first thing to know about any place that takes savings is who has checked it, and the place to find that out is a list Nepal Rastra Bank keeps on its website.

The list sorts the institutions the central bank licenses into four classes, by how much capital their owners must put in, what they may do and how wide an area they may work in. Class A are the commercial banks, which may do nearly everything a bank does: take deposits and lend, change foreign money, open letters of credit for traders, handle the government’s money. Class B, the development banks, may do much of the same but less. Class C, the finance companies, take deposits and lend, much of it in hire purchase and leasing, where a vehicle or a machine is paid for in installments and stays the lender’s until it is. Class D, the microfinance companies, lend small sums to groups of members who save regularly, with or without anything pledged; Chapter 18 is about them. By mid-October 2026 there were 20 commercial banks, 17 development banks, 16 finance companies and 50 microfinance companies, plus one infrastructure development bank in no class at all.

There used to be far more. In 2012 there were 220: 32 commercial banks, 88 development banks, 77 finance companies and 23 microfinance companies. The central bank had started pushing them to merge in 2011, reasoning that a few large, well-capitalized banks are harder to break than many small ones, and the count fell year after year. A saver whose bank merged into another simply became a customer of the new one.

Being on the list means three things. The institution has a license, which the central bank can take away. It is inspected, its books looked at and its loans checked. And the law requires it to have its deposits guaranteed, up to a limit, by a fund it pays into. The fund’s own page in April 2026 listed every commercial bank, development bank and finance company among its members, but only two of the fifty microfinance companies. The guarantee is the part that answers the question.

Banks aren’t the only places that hold people’s money. Insurance companies, the Employees Provident Fund, the Citizen Investment Trust and the Social Security Fund all hold large sums for ordinary people, but none of them takes deposits that can be asked for back on demand, and each has its own law and its own regulator. Mutual funds, which Chapter 25 comes to, hold savers’ money too, under SEBON. And a cooperative, which takes deposits much as a bank does, is not on the central bank’s list at all. That difference is most of the story.

Why a guarantee at all

Any bank can fail. It lends most of what it is given, and if too many of its borrowers can’t repay, it may not have enough to give its depositors back. Even a sound bank can be brought down by fear. A bank keeps only a slice of its deposits as cash, and if every depositor turns up on the same morning, it can’t pay them all, however good its loans are. Once people believe a bank is in trouble, the sensible thing for each of them is to get there first, which is how a rumor becomes a run and a run becomes a failure.

The United States learned this the hard way. In the four years from 1930 to 1933 more than 9,000 of its banks failed, and in 1933 alone some 4,000 closed and never reopened. Families lost savings they had thought were as safe as anything could be. That year Congress set up the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and from 1 January 1934 each depositor’s money was insured up to $2,500. In 1934 only nine banks failed. The reason is almost circular. Once small depositors know they will be paid whatever happens, they have no reason to run, and without a run, a bank that is merely having a bad week survives it.

Not everyone liked the idea. The treasury secretary of the day was strongly against it, and the president had his doubts; opponents worried that it would be costly and would take away the penalty for running a bank badly. That worry never went away, and it explains why deposit guarantees everywhere have a limit. If every rupee were guaranteed, a bank could take any risk to pay a higher rate, and big depositors would have no reason to care which bank was careful. With a limit, the people with the least, who can least afford to lose and are least able to check a bank’s books, are protected in full, and those with more keep a reason to watch. More than 120 countries now have some kind of deposit guarantee.

How Nepal’s guarantee works

Nepal’s is the Deposit and Credit Guarantee Fund, owned mostly by the government, with a share held by Nepal Rastra Bank. It is older than its deposit guarantee: it was set up in 1974 to guarantee loans, so that banks would lend to farmers and small businesses they would otherwise turn away, and it still does. It began guaranteeing deposits only in 2010, a year after a development bank had collapsed with heavy losses and left small depositors worried. The first limit was Rs. 2 lakh a person, and the first institutions covered were microfinance companies. The limit was later raised to Rs. 3 lakh, and on Shrawan 1, 2079 (July 2022) to Rs. 5 lakh, where it still stood in 2026.

The rules fit in a few lines. The guarantee covers people, not companies or organizations. It covers savings and fixed deposits, added together. And the limit is per person, per institution: up to Rs. 5 lakh of one person’s savings at one bank. The bank pays the Fund a small premium for this, 0.16% a year of the deposits guaranteed, and a bank that doesn’t guarantee its deposits can lose its license.

02 lakh5 lakh8 lakhRs. 2 lakh in a bankRs. 8 lakh in a bankRs. 8 lakh in a cooperativethe limit, Rs. 5 lakhpaid by the guarantee fundwaits for what the liquidator raisesno guarantee fund behind it
Figure 12.1 Three made-up depositors whose bank or cooperative has failed. Green is paid by the guarantee fund, up to its limit of Rs. 5 lakh a person in one institution (since 2022, and still in July 2026); amber waits for whatever the liquidator raises; gray has no guarantee fund behind it, as for cooperatives in 2026.

When a licensed bank fails, a court appoints a liquidator, someone whose job is to close it down: collect what borrowers owe, sell what the bank owns, and pay its debts in an order the law sets. The liquidator draws up the list of depositors and sends it to the Fund, and the Fund pays each one their guaranteed sum through the liquidator. Then everything else is shared out, in a fixed order: first the costs of the liquidation, then the Fund gets back what it paid out, then the rest of the deposits, then the staff’s pay, then the government, then other lenders, and the bank’s owners last. So a depositor with Rs. 2 lakh in a failed bank gets it all from the Fund. One with Rs. 8 lakh gets Rs. 5 lakh from the Fund and waits for the other Rs. 3 lakh, which comes only if the bank’s assets are worth enough once sold. Depositors stand near the front of that queue and the owners at the back, which is the reverse of who chose to take the risk.

This has happened. When a finance company failed some years ago, its depositors were paid up to the limit of the time, about Rs. 110 million in all.

By mid-July 2025 the Fund was guaranteeing 57 million accounts, holding about Rs. 1,579 billion between them. A guarantee is only as strong as the money behind it, and the government’s auditor has warned that the Fund’s reserves wouldn’t cover the collapse of one large commercial bank; the Fund’s head answered that nobody should assume it couldn’t meet its promises. In practice the central bank tries never to let it come to that. It watches the banks precisely so that a weak one is merged, rescued or wound down before its depositors are hurt, and the guarantee is the last line, not the first.

Cooperatives: what they are for

A cooperative, सहकारी, is a business owned by the people who use it. A dairy cooperative is farmers who sell their milk together. A savings and credit cooperative is neighbors who pool their savings and lend to one another. The idea is simple and old. Nepal’s first, a credit cooperative at Bakhanpur in Chitwan, was started in 1957, and the day is still kept as National Cooperative Day. The constitution names cooperatives as one of the economy’s three pillars, beside the government and private business. By mid-March 2026 there were about 32,000 of them, with millions of members.

How one is run is written into the Cooperatives Act. At least thirty people (more for savings and credit in a big city) start it together; anyone of 16 or over who lives in its area and buys a share can join. The members meet in a general assembly, which elects a board to run it, at least a third of its seats for women where possible, and a separate account supervision committee of three to watch the books. Every member has one vote, however many shares they hold, which is the deepest difference from a company, where votes follow money. A cooperative can be about one thing, such as savings and credit, milk or tea, or about several at once, a multipurpose cooperative; only one registered for savings and credit may make taking savings and lending its main business. And it takes savings only from its members and lends only to them.

At their best, cooperatives do what banks don’t. They reach villages no bank branch reaches, they lend small sums to people a bank wouldn’t look at twice, and the person deciding knows the borrower. Honest ones run in every part of the country, many for decades, and for many families they are the only place to save or borrow at all. Chapter 9 of Economics, for the Curious has them as a kind of firm.

But a savings and credit cooperative is not a bank, and in the question that matters here it has been very different. A bank is licensed and inspected by the central bank. A cooperative was only registered, by a local government, a province or the federal government, depending on where it works. The International Monetary Fund counted as many as 761 bodies that could be its regulator, and noted that registering a cooperative doesn’t bring the scrutiny a license does. Above all, a cooperative’s savings were outside the deposit guarantee. There was no fund to pay its members back if it failed.

Some cooperatives offered more interest than banks did, and it is worth asking where any extra comes from, because the answer is always the same. A savings and credit cooperative earns its money the way a bank does: it lends what it is given and charges more than it pays, and the law lets the gap be at most six percentage points. Take a made-up cooperative paying 12% on savings. To cover that and its own costs, it had to lend at well over 12%, and for years the registrar let cooperatives charge as much as 16%. Who borrows at such a rate when a bank lends for much less? People a bank has turned down, or ventures a bank won’t touch. Some of those loans are fine, but more of them are risky than a bank’s, which is why the bank turned them down. The higher rate isn’t a gift. It is the saver being paid for a risk, whether or not anyone said so.

There is no way round this. Nobody can pay you more than the safe rate for nothing, because if they could earn more without risk, they would have no reason to share it with you. A higher rate always means more risk somewhere: in the borrowers, in what the money is put into, or in the people running it. Sometimes it means the last kind of risk only, and the high rate was being paid from the next saver’s deposit.

The collapse, as depositors saw it

What happened from about 2022 is told as the system’s story in Chapter 15 of Economics, for the Curious. From the depositor’s side of the counter, it looked like this.

Many cooperatives had put their members’ money into land, buying plots to sell on at a profit. A former judge who had led an official inquiry into them, set up in 2013, called it most cooperatives’ way of doing business. In 2022 the government halted the plotting of land into small parcels for sale, and land stopped selling. A cooperative whose money was in land it couldn’t sell had no cash to pay the interest it had promised, or to give savings back to members who asked. In others the people running them had taken the members’ money for themselves.

Members found out much as the saver in Surkhet did: reassurance, then a locked office. They gathered outside the offices, and then took to the streets. A special committee of parliament looked at 40 cooperatives in the cities and found them owing Rs. 87.89 billion, Rs. 71.30 billion of it in members’ deposits, with little hope of recovering their loans.

The law then changed, slowly. In 2025 the Cooperatives Act was amended: a National Cooperative Regulatory Authority was set up to watch savings and credit cooperatives, a member’s savings up to Rs. 5 lakh were to be repaid first from whatever a cooperative had, and savings and credit cooperatives were required to join the Deposit and Credit Guarantee Fund. An ordinance of April 2026 went further. It required every savings and credit cooperative to hold an operating license from the Authority, renewed each year, giving those already working a year to get one, and every cooperative that takes savings at all to join the guarantee fund. A bill to replace the ordinance went through parliament that summer, and we couldn’t find what its final text kept. The joining hadn’t happened by April 2026. The Fund had said it would take cooperatives on only once they were properly regulated, and its list of members that month still had only banks, development banks, finance companies and two microfinance companies; we found nothing to say any cooperative has joined since. And the 2025 promise to repay the first Rs. 5 lakh first isn’t a guarantee: being first in line helps only if there is something in the till.

Money began to come back in May 2026, from a fund the government set up that April with Rs. 250 million of public money; by November it held about Rs. 650 million, the rest paid in by the cooperatives’ operators. It went first to the smallest savers, those with up to Rs. 10,000, then to single women, people over 60, Dalits, indigenous peoples, and people with severe disabilities or serious illness. By November 2026, about 11,000 depositors had had some Rs. 710 million returned or settled, in cash or by adjustments in their accounts, out of about 76,000 owed nearly Rs. 46 billion. Those were only the depositors of the 23 cooperatives the federal government had declared “troubled”, the legal step that starts this process; a few more had been declared by provinces. Groups of depositors estimated that more than 500 other cooperatives had stopped paying without being declared anything, and their members were not in the scheme at all.

None of this means every cooperative was bad. Most of the country’s cooperatives never failed. But the members of those that did found out, too late, what their savings had been missing: someone checking the books before the trouble, and a fund to pay them after.

So the question at the start has an answer. Ask of any place that holds savings whether it is licensed, and by whom. A licensed bank, development bank or finance company is on Nepal Rastra Bank’s list, inspected by it, and its depositors’ savings are guaranteed up to Rs. 5 lakh a person, in each one, by the Deposit and Credit Guarantee Fund; for a microfinance company, the Fund’s member list says whether it is covered. A cooperative is owned and run by its members and can do a great deal of good; a law of 2026 set out to license savings and credit cooperatives, and in 2026 its savings still had no fund behind them. And a rate well above the banks’ is never free: it is the price of a risk, and the saver is the one carrying it.

Try this

  • Find Nepal Rastra Bank’s list of licensed institutions on its website. Look up the bank or finance company your family uses, note its class, and check that it is on the Deposit and Credit Guarantee Fund’s list of members.
  • Find the guarantee limit on the Deposit and Credit Guarantee Fund’s website. Then work out, for a made-up person with Rs. 6 lakh in one bank and Rs. 2 lakh in another, how much would be guaranteed if both failed.
  • If your family has savings at a cooperative, ask an adult who registered it (a local government, a province or the federal government) and whether it is a savings and credit cooperative. These are questions to ask, not reasons to move anything.

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