Skip to content

← Economics

Why Some Countries Stay Poor

Chapter 27 · Development

In this chapter 4 sections
  1. The circle
  2. Two old answers: Marx and Lewis
  3. Institutions, geography, or the world order?
  4. The ones that broke out

When Britain handed Botswana its independence in 1966, the new country had 12 kilometers of paved road. Twenty-two of its people had a university degree. Half of what its government spent was paid for by Britain, and most outsiders wrote it off as a place that would always send its young men to work in South Africa’s mines. Six years earlier, South Korea as a whole had saved about one won in every hundred it produced. Both are now far richer than Nepal. Plenty of countries that started out in the same state are not.

Why some countries stay poor is the oldest question in this part of economics, and nobody has a single answer. But the answers people give all start from the same picture, so it comes first.

The circle

Poor countries have a lot in common. Most people work on small farms or in tiny shops and workshops, without contracts; output a person is low; many adults had little schooling; roads, power and clinics are thin on the ground; and a large share of what is made comes from farming or from digging things out of the earth. Chapter 21 listed these features for Nepal. Each one helps keep the others in place.

The heart of it is capital: the tools, machines, roads, buildings and skills that let a person make more in an hour. Adding to that stock is called capital formation, पुँजी निर्माण, and it happens in three steps. First, somebody has to save: spend less than they earn this year. Then the savings have to be gathered, usually by banks, cooperatives and share markets, and lent to people who can use them. Then the borrowers have to invest, which in economics means building or buying the things that make more things, not buying shares. A tractor is investment; so is a classroom, a canal or a power line.

The trouble is that each step is hardest where it is most needed. A family that can barely feed itself can’t put much aside. With little saved, little is built. With little built, each worker makes little, and so earns little, which brings the circle back to the start. In the early 1950s Ragnar Nurkse, an Estonian-born economist at Columbia University, called this the vicious circle of poverty: a country is poor, roughly, because it is poor. The circle also turns from the buyer’s side. Where most people have little to spend, a factory has few customers, so there is less reason to build one.

A circle like that can be broken at any point, and every theory in this chapter is really an argument about where. Korea shows that it can be. In 1960 Korea saved about 1% of what it produced. By 1990 they saved 39%, among the highest shares in the world, and its factories, roads and schools grew to match.

Nepal’s own case is a puzzle the circle doesn’t quite fit. Measured only from income earned at home, Nepalis save very little: in 2025 about 7% of what the country produced was left after everyone’s spending. But add the money sent home from abroad, which Chapter 32 follows, and national saving comes to well over a third. Investment, though, was only about 24% of output, much of what families buy comes from abroad, and Chapter 19 showed how much of the government’s own capital budget goes unspent each year. In Nepal, the first step of capital formation is no longer the weak one. The last step, turning savings into things that make more things at home, is.

Two old answers: Marx and Lewis

Karl Marx, whom Chapter 4 met as the great critic of markets, had a theory of how economies develop at all. He looked at history through two things. One is the forces of production: the land, tools, machines and skills a society works with. The other is the relations of production: who owns those things and who works for whom. For a while the two fit. But the forces keep growing, and the old relations, he wrote in 1859, turn into “fetters” that hold them back, until a struggle between classes breaks them and a new kind of society takes over. He saw history moving through such stages, and his followers later set them out as a list: early communal life, slavery, feudalism, capitalism, and then, he expected, socialism.

Capitalism, in his account, runs on surplus value, the gap between what a worker makes and what the worker is paid. If a worker turns out goods worth Rs. 2,000 in a day and is paid Rs. 1,200, the Rs. 800 left is the owner’s to keep. An owner who wants more has three ways to get it: make the day longer, pay less for it, or make each hour produce more, with better machines and trained hands. Competition forces every owner to keep doing this, and to plow the surplus back into more machines. “Accumulate, accumulate! That is Moses and the prophets!” Marx wrote in Capital, mocking the creed of the factory owners of his day.

That, he argued, is also why the system lurches into crisis. Machines push workers out, and the unemployed, a “reserve army” in his phrase, hold wages down. Bigger firms cut their prices and smaller ones go under. Workers can’t afford to buy everything the factories now make, so goods pile up, prices and output fall, credit dries up and firms fail together. He also thought the rate of profit would tend to fall as machines replaced labor, and that in the end the workers would organize and overturn the whole arrangement.

On poor countries Marx was of two minds. He thought capitalism would spread, and wrote that the more industrial country “only shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future.” He also wrote that it was born in plunder: the gold and silver of the Americas, the looting of the East Indies and the slave trade were, as he put it with bitter irony, “the rosy dawn of the era of capitalist production.” Both halves still have readers. The crises he described kept coming, as Chapter 17 tells, but the final collapse he expected never came where he expected it, and few economists now accept the theory of value his surplus rests on. Whether his account explains why some places stay poor is argued to this day.

Arthur Lewis came at the question from a different direction. He was born in 1915 on St. Lucia, a British island in the Caribbean, and grew up under a colonial color bar: he wanted to be an engineer, but neither the government nor the white-owned firms would employ a Black engineer, so he studied business at the London School of Economics instead. By 1948 he was a full professor at Manchester, and from about 1950 he turned to the economics of poor countries. One day in August 1952, as he later remembered it, the answer came to him “walking down the road in Bangkok.”

His idea, published in 1954, splits a poor economy in two. In the villages, farms carry more hands than they need, the disguised unemployment of Chapter 24. In the towns, a small modern sector of factories, mines and plantations is run for profit. That modern sector can hire as many people as it wants from the farms at a wage somewhat above what they got at home, by a third or so in his reckoning, because there are always more waiting. So wages stay low, profits are high, and the owners reinvest the profits in more factories, which hire more people from the farms. Saving rises, in Lewis’s story, because the profit-making part of the economy grows. It goes on until the spare hands are used up, and then wages everywhere start to rise. Lewis shared the 1979 Nobel prize in economics for this work, and he is still the only Black economist to have won it.

Nepal has the first half of Lewis’s picture: farms with more hands than work. The factories that hired them, though, were mostly in the Gulf and Malaysia.

Institutions, geography, or the world order?

Some explanations start with the land itself. Jeffrey Sachs, an American economist, has long argued that geography matters directly: hot climates, diseases such as malaria, and distance from the sea. Countries far from a coast pay more to move every sack in and out, and malaria saps workers and children year after year. In 2003 he reported that malaria still goes with lower incomes even after the quality of a country’s government is allowed for. Nepal has no coast, and steep, broken hills make every road it builds costly.

Others say that geography works mainly through the rules people live by. Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James Robinson, in a famous paper of 2001, looked at the countries Europe colonized. Where European settlers could live, they came in numbers and set up rules that protected their own property and gave them a say: what the three call inclusive institutions. Where disease killed settlers quickly, as in much of tropical Africa, few came, and the colonizers set up extractive institutions instead, built to take the land’s wealth and the people’s labor for a small elite. Those rules outlasted the empires. As evidence, the three used the death rates of soldiers and settlers centuries ago, and found that the higher they were, the poorer a former colony is today. They also found a reversal of fortune: the places that were richest when the Europeans arrived, such as the Aztec lands that became Mexico, are now poorer than the thinly peopled lands that became the United States and Canada. Their favorite picture is the town of Nogales, cut in half by the border fence between Mexico and the United States: the same climate, the same food and music, many shared ancestors, and very different lives on either side. The three shared the Nobel prize in 2024.

The argument is not over. The old death rates are rough, and some critics say they don’t hold up, though the result survives when the most doubtful figures are left out; the settlers brought their own skills and schooling, not just their rules, and that alone could make the difference; and Sachs replies that malaria still matters on its own. The study covers only former colonies, and Nepal was never one, so whatever holds it back, it isn’t a design drawn up by an empire. What the three describe goes beyond colonies, though: wherever a small group writes the rules for its own benefit, it has little reason to change them, because it can’t trust that it will be looked after once power is shared.

Trade has its own rules, and Lewis noticed one that is easy to miss. In his model of “coffee and steel,” the price a poor country gets for its tropical crops is held down by how little its farmers can grow of their own food. As long as a worker on a food farm makes little, a coffee picker can be hired for little too, so coffee stays cheap against steel, however hard the picker works. Who writes the rules of world trade, and how rich countries protected their own industries before preaching free trade, is the argument of Chapter 20.

So the argument comes down to three answers. Those who stress institutions, as Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson do, say a country’s own rules decide most of it. Those who stress geography, as Sachs does, say disease and distance hold some places back whatever their rules. Those who stress the world order, an idea that grew at the United Nations around 1950 and became known as dependency theory, say poor countries are held at the edge of a world economy run for its rich center: by the terms on which they trade, borrow and were once ruled from outside, from the plunder Marx described to Lewis’s coffee and steel. Its critics point to Korea, which grew rich by selling to that same world. Each side can point to countries that fit its story, and none explains them all, which is why the few countries that broke out are watched so closely.

Rules work inside a country too. Good governance, सुशासन, means running the state so that it is accountable, transparent and effective, follows the law and listens to the people. Economic good governance, आर्थिक सुशासन, means using the country’s resources openly and answerably for growth and a fair share. It can be checked in plain ways: where the revenue comes from, how public money is spent, and whether spending stays inside the budget’s limits.

Honest offices are economics because a bribe works like a tax that builds nothing. It raises the cost of every permit and contract, and it decides who gets them by payment rather than by who would do the job best. Sometimes it takes the thing itself. World Bank studies in Guinea, Cameroon, Uganda and Tanzania estimated that between 30% and 70% of the government’s medicines never reached patients, but disappeared into the black market.

Corruption is hard to count, because nobody records a bribe. The best-known attempt, Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, combines 13 surveys and expert assessments of how corrupt a country’s public sector is thought to be, mostly asked of business people and specialists. It doesn’t measure what ordinary people pay, or corruption in private firms, or money laundering. In the index for 2025, published in February 2026, Nepal scored 34 out of 100, 109th of 182 countries, below the world’s average of 42. Denmark came first with 89. Korea scored 63 and Botswana 58. Bangladesh scored 24, lower than Nepal, and it has grown faster than Nepal for thirty years. Honest offices help, but the numbers don’t show that a country must clean up first and grow afterward.

The ones that broke out

South Korea is the case everyone cites, and Chapter 20 tells how its government pushed chosen industries while its exports paid for machines. Over the sixty years in the figure its income a person grew about 29 times. Those are dollars at exchange rates, which make Korea look about four times as rich as Nepal already in 1965; Chapter 21’s purchasing-power dollars, which allow for things being cheaper in poor countries, put the two much closer at the start. Botswana’s story is quieter. Its first president, Seretse Khama, was chief of the Bangwato, under whose land the first great diamond finds would be made. In 1967 his government passed a law putting all minerals under the ground in the hands of the national government, not the chiefs, his own people included. Diamonds were found at Orapa soon after, and later at Jwaneng, and in 1975 the government renegotiated its agreement with the mining company to take half the profits. It kept an honest civil service, hired for competence, kept foreign experts until its own people were trained, spent the money on roads, schools and clinics, and was careful with its budget. Many countries with diamonds or oil have done worse than those without; Botswana grew about 7% a year from 1965 to 2000. It is landlocked and mostly tropical too.

$ a person a year, 2015 prices$250$500$1,000$2,000$4,000$8,000$16,000$32,0001965198520052025South KoreaBotswanaBangladeshNepal
Figure 27.1 Income a person, 1965 to 2025, in US dollars at 2015 prices, converted at exchange rates, not at purchasing power as in Chapter 21 (World Bank). Each gridline up the scale is twice the one below, so a steeper line means faster growth.

Botswana’s success has its limits. Since about 2000 its line has flattened, to about 1% a year, its gaps between rich and poor are among the world’s widest, AIDS struck it harder than almost anywhere, and one party has won every election since independence. Bangladesh is the newest of the three, and the most like Nepal. It began in 1971 as one of the poorest countries on earth. For twenty years it barely grew; since 1990 its income a person has grown more than four times, against Nepal’s three. Much of that came from sewing clothes for the world: it is now the world’s second-largest exporter of ready-made garments. The price of that has been heavy at times. In 2013 the Rana Plaza building near Dhaka, which held five garment factories, collapsed and killed 1,134 people. Bangladeshis now live longer than Nepalis, about 75 years against 71.

Can money from rich countries speed this up? On that, two economists who both care about the poorest have disagreed in public for twenty years. Jeffrey Sachs argues in The End of Poverty (2005) that the poorest countries are stuck in a poverty trap and can’t save their way out, so aid large enough to fill the gap could push them over the edge, and he asked rich countries for enough to end extreme poverty by 2025. William Easterly answered that this was the plan of the 1950s again, that $2.3 trillion of aid over five decades had left the most aid-dependent regions stagnating, and that big plans by outsiders can’t be tested or held to account. Even Easterly agrees that some aid works: vaccination campaigns and the simple salt-and-sugar drink for diarrhea have, he wrote, likely helped babies’ deaths fall in every region, Africa included. Chapter 22 follows the same quarrel, small tested steps against big change, into poverty itself.

Nepal’s Ministry of Finance counts the aid in its yearly Development Cooperation Report. In the year to mid-July 2025, as the report was described in the press, Nepal’s development partners paid out about $1.6 billion, about two-thirds of it as loans, a third as grants and technical help. The World Bank gave the most, $541 million, then the Asian Development Bank, $443 million; India was the largest single country, at $108 million. Transport took the biggest share. Aid can pay for a road or a vaccine. What it can’t do is the slow work at home: turning savings into things that make more things, and keeping the rules fair enough that people bother to build.

So no single answer explains why some countries stay poor. Poverty feeds itself, because the poor can’t save much, and what is saved has to be turned into machines, roads and skills before it does any good. Marx saw capital piling up through the work of people who didn’t own it, and lurching from crisis to crisis; Lewis saw spare hands on the farms as the fuel for a growing modern sector. Geography, old empires, trade and the rules a country lives by all play their part, and economists still argue over which matters most. Korea, Botswana and Bangladesh broke out in different ways, which is itself a lesson: there is more than one door.

Found a mistake? Please tell us.